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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

A. Nature 0f the Case
This case involves Leonard

highway

Road No.

2, a

right-of—way approved and accepted as a public

1908 by the Kootenai County Board 0f County Commissioners (“BOCC”) upon

in

R p. 24. The controversy involves the alleged

acceptance 0f a viewer’s report 0f that right-of—way.

abandonment 0f that right-of—way

in

1910

its

that appears in the July 13,

1910

BOCC

Minutes.

Id.

Following notice and a public hearing, the Board 0f Commissioners for East Side Highway District
(“District”) declined t0 validate

Leonard Road N0. 2

(also identiﬁed as

right-of—way because the historical documents in the record before

vacated and abandoned the right-of—way two years after

it

it

Road N0. 23 1)

as a public

indicated that the

BOCC

was accepted.

Seeking t0 overturn the District’s decision, the Appellant (“Palmer Family Trust”) initiated

two appeals

in the

Kootenai County District Court. The two appeals were consolidated into one

appeal. Following brieﬁng and oral argument, the district court

decision.

The Palmer Family Trust appeals once more

validation decision concerning

Road No. 231

The Palmer Family Trust

(also

known

1.

This assertion

is

as

District’s validation

Court seeking to have the District’s

Leonard Road N0. 2) reversed.

characterizes the nature of this case

abandonment and vacation proceeding masquerading
Brief page

to this

afﬁrmed the

0n appeal

as a right-of—way

as a road validation proceeding. Appellant’s

not supported by the agency record 0r Idaho law.

Instead, the appeal reﬂects the

Palmer Family Trust’s refusal

t0

concede that the same

set

of Kootenai County historical records that established Road N0. 231 was approved and accepted

by the

BOCC as a public road also established that two years later

it

was abandoned by the BOCC.

The

District recognized

under such circumstances that

AR 000701

abandoned road.

had no

legal basis t0 validate an

.1

Without any authority

had the authority

it

t0 support its position, the

to validate the

Palmer Family Trust argues the

abandoned road as public right-of—way despite

its

District

abandonment

over one hundred (100) years ago. The Palmer Family Trust contended below, and contends on
appeal, that the District could impose an

owner by ﬁnding validation was

uncompensated exaction upon the underlying property

The

in the public interest.

public’s interest t0 exercise an inverse condemnation

validation proceeding.

The

district court also

did not

District disagreed that

it

was

in the

upon a property owner by means 0f a

ﬁnd

error in the District’s refusal t0 take

property from individuals without compensation in the guise of a right-of—way ﬁnding that such a

road would serve a public

interest.

B. Factual and Procedural History

The following
court’s decision,

is

a

summary of the course ofproceedings and the evidence from the

which expressly did not supplant the

District’s Findings

0f Fact.

Leonard Road N0. 231 appears 0n a viewer’s report approved by the
1908.

R p.

175.

The Palmer Family Trust requested approval from the

of the Leonard Road right-of—way t0
1908 right-of—way.

1

Id.

install a private

Thereafter, the

175.

BOCC 0n August

12,

District to utilize a portion

driveway and surveyed the location of the

Warmers disputed the existence 0f a public right-of—way

For agency record was submitted on appeal as an

exhibit.

The agency record was bates numbered by the
“AR” followed by the

agency. For the reader’s convenience, facts from the agency record exhibit are cited to as

agency bates page number.

R p.

district

over and across lands
Resolution 2017-05 to

now owned by
initiate

The validation hearing

R p.

175.

them.

for

Road No. 231 was scheduled

Notice 0f the public hearing was published.
14,

20, 2017, the District adopted

road validation proceedings for Leonard Road N0. 23 1.

A notice 0f the hearing was prepared,

On December

On November

Id.

for hearing

Id.

on January

15, 2018.

and adjacent property owners were notiﬁed.

Id.

Id.

2017, Rande and Debra Warner through their attorney, Nathan Ohler,

requested a continuance of the road validation public hearing to allow the Warners' petition to
vacate and abandon

Road N0. 231

t0

be heard

a second letter With the same request

at the

same

was submitted by

time.

R p.

175.

the Warmers. Id.

On December

18,

2017,

The Board declined

the

request t0 continue the validation hearing. Id.

A

staff report

Commissioners.

The

staff report

R p.

was

was prepared by

175.

The

District staff

validation public hearing

presented, public testimony

District Board's review. Id.

and submitted

was

t0 the District

was conducted 0n January

received, and exhibits

Board 0f

15, 2018. Id.

were submitted

for the

Following deliberation, the District Board voted to decline validation

0f Road N0. 231 as a public right-of—way.

Id.

During the public comment portion 0f a regular

District

Board meeting 0n February

12,

2018, Marcus Palmer, speaking on behalf of the Palmer Family Trust, requested the Board set
aside

its

decision 0n

Road N0. 231 and conduct

a rehearing. Id. Mr. Palmer submitted additional

materials t0 support his request for a rehearing. Id.

On March
Open

19,

2018, the District received a written Request for Reconsideration and t0 Re-

Public Hearing from the Palmer Family Trust's attorney.

R p.

177.

The

District

conducted

a regular meeting on

Macomber on

March

During the public comment section 0f the meeting, Art

19, 2018. Id.

behalf of the Palmer Family Trust, verbally requested the Board re-Open the public

hearing and reconsider

its

pending validation proceeding.

Id.

The Board tabled the entry of a ﬁnal

decision on the validation. Id.

On March

26, 2018, at a special meeting, the

Board entered

its

Findings 0f Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order declining t0 validate Road No. 231 as a public road or public rightof-way.
Trust's

R p.

177.

motion

At the same meeting,

to re-open the public hearing

On April

16,

set

Board

set a

brieﬁng schedule for the Palmer Family

and reconsider

its

prior decision. Id.

2018, the Board considered the Palmer Family Trust's motion to re-open the

public hearing and reconsider

and

the

a public hearing for

its

opinion.

R p.

177.

The Board granted

the motion t0 reconsider,

May 21, 2018, t0 re-Open the validation hearing. Id. A notice 0f the re-

OWMMMMQWWmmmwmmmmwmmhwmmwmwmmmki®ﬂ®yMﬂM&me
Warmers submitted a second opposition

On May 21,

t0 the re-opened validation hearing. Id.

2018, the District Board re-opened the validation hearing.

p. 177.

Following

public testimony and receipt 0f additional evidence, the District Board again declined t0 validate

Leonard Road No. 23 1.

At

the June 25,

Conclusions of
entered

new

Id.

2018 meeting, the Board rescinded the

Law and

Order for the Leonard Road validation.

Findings 0f Fact, Conclusions of

Report Road 231, Leonard Road No.
177-178.

May

2,

Law and

21, 2018, Findings 0f Fact,

R

p.

177. Instead, the

Board

an Order declining t0 validate Viewers

which was the subject 0f the

district court appeal.

R pp.

On

September 26, 2019, the

district court

issued

Judicial Review.

R

several grounds.

The Palmer’s appeal portions 0f

pp. 175-190.

The

district court erred in several aspects

district court

its

Memorandum

afﬁrmed the

Decision and Order 0n

District’s validation order

0n

the district court’s decision, contending the

addressed below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
When this

Court reviews the decision of a

district court acting in

the Court independently reviews the agency record.

Homestead Farms,

an appellate capacity,

Inc.

v.

Bd.

ofComm ’rs,

141 Idaho 855, 858, 119 P.3d 630, 633 (2005).

Idaho Code § 40-208 governs judicial review of validation proceedings. Floyd

Comm ’rs,

v.

Bd. 0f

131 Idaho 234, 238, 953 P.2d 984, 988 (1998). LC. § 40-208 provides, in pertinent

part:

The court
district

board of county or highway
defer to the board of county or highway district

shall consider the record before the

commissioners and shall

commissioners on matters in Which such board has appropriately exercised its
discretion with respect to the evaluation 0f the public interest. As t0 the
determination of highway or public right-of—way creation, width and abandonment,
the court

may

new

accept

evidence and testimony supplemental to the record

provided by the county 0r highway

anew. In cases of alleged

shown

in the record,

district,

irregularities in

and the court

shall consider those issues

procedure before the commissioners, not

may be taken in the court. The
argument and receive written briefs.

proof thereon

request, shall hear oral

court,

upon

I.C. § 40-208(6).

As

stated in

LC.

§ 40-208(6), the district court shall defer t0 the board's discretionary

decisions regarding the public interest, but shall consider the issues of creation, width, and

abandonment "anew." This Court will not

substitute

its

judgement

for that

0f the county (0r in

this

case, the agency) as to the evidence

0f questions of fact. Sopalyk v. Lemhi County, 15 1 Idaho 809,

813, 264 P.3d 916, 920 (2011). This Court Will uphold the agency’s ﬁndings unless they are

unsupported by substantial competent evidence. State Dep ’t ofHealth
18, 21,

&

Welfare

v.

Roe, 139 Idaho

72 P.3d 858, 861 (2003). This Court has deﬁned substantial and competent evidence as

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate t0 support a conclusion.”
E.g.,

Folks

v.

Moscow School Dist.

"Idaho Code
statute, and,

applies."

§

40-208 provides the mechanism for judicial review, Which

Where the

Cobbley

v.

N0. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 836, 933 P.2d 642, 645 (1997).

statute

is

governed by

does not speak t0 a matter relating t0 judicial review, Rule 84

City ofChallis, 143 Idaho 130, 134, 139 P.3d 732, 736 (2006).

"Erroneous conclusions of law

Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho
not substitute

its

judgment

made by an agency may be

at

corrected on appeal."

859, 119 P.3d at 634. However, "[t]his Court will

0f the County as t0 the weight 0f the evidence
Will uphold the County's ﬁndings unless they are
for that

0n questions 0f fact. It
unsupported by substantial competent evidence." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cnty., 151 Idaho
809, 813, 264 P.3d 916, 920 (201 1) (citation omitted); see also Galli v. Idaho Cnly.,
146 Idaho 155, 158, 191 P.3d 233,236 (2008).

FlyingA Ranch,

Inc.

v.

Cly.

Commissioners ofFremont

Cly.,

157 Idaho 937,342 P.3d

649, 651-52 (2015).

II.

1.

The

district court

issues raised

by

ISSUES

ON APPEAL

did not err in refusing to reverse the District based

upon

the appellate

the Palmer Family Trust in the Introduction section 0f its opening

appeal brief (and raised again in separate section).

2.

The

district court

did not err by holding that substantial and competent evidence

supported the District’s conclusion that the validation
public interest.

0f Road N0. 231 was not in the

The

3.

district court

did not err in holding the District had cause as deﬁned

by applicable

statutory provisions to initiate validation proceedings.

The

4.

district court

suffered

did not err in holding the Palmer Family Trust

t0 allow their petition for

The

5.

showed n0

injury

the denial 0f hearing the Warner’s motion to continue the validation hearing

by

district court

abandonment

t0

be heard

at the

same

time.

did not err in holding quasi-estoppel did not preclude the District from

refusing t0 validate

Road N0. 231

as a public road.

III.

ARGUMENT

A. The district court did not err in refusing t0 reverse the District based upon the
appellate issues raised

by the Palmer Family Trust

in the Introduction section 0f its

opening appeal brief (and raised again in separate sections).
The Palmer Family Trust’s ﬁrst appeal issue raised in the Introduction discusses

at

length

the fact that after the District scheduled and advertised the validation public hearing, the District

received a request from the Warmers t0 continue the validation hearing and combine

abandonment request

that the

Warmers were just then submitting on December

The agency record does not support
refused t0 hear the abandonment petition.

it

with an

14, 2017.2

the Palmer Family Trust argument that the District

AR p. 022. When this argument was made to the district

court, the district court held, “Further. the record

shows the

District acted appropriately

and

intended t0 ‘handle the abandonment request the same as any other the District has received in the
past.”’

R

Also, the Palmer Family Trust’s allegation that

p. 186.

it

ignored the request

is

not

2

On December 14, 2017, Rande and Debra Warner through their attorney, Nathan Ohler, requested a
continuance 0f the road validation public hearing to allow the Warners’ petition to vacate and abandon Road N0.
231

t0

be heard

at the

same

time.

AR pp. 014-016. On December

18,

2017, a second

letter

With the same request was

AR

submitted by the Warmers.
pp. 020-02 1. The Board declined the request to continue the validation hearing, and
informed the Warners’ attorney the request the same as any others received in the past.
p. 022. It did not refuse

AR

to consider the petition.

supported by the record.
separate proceeding

As observed by

which

is

on appeal, and

opening appeal

is

issue with this holding although

initiated a

it is

not identiﬁed as a

contained in the introduction section 0f the Palmer Family Trust’s

The Palmer Family Trust claims but

brief.

“The abandonment request

irrelevant t0 this appeal.” Id.

The Palmer Family Trust takes
separate issue

the district court,

for the District’s improper refusal t0

process the abandonment petition, the Palmer Family Trust would have a public right-of—way today

because the District could not have abandoned the (previously abandoned) disputed public right-

of-way because

it

left

the trust landlocked in Violation 0f I.C. § 40-203.

This argument

is

statutory grounds for the

If there

circuitous.

Board 0f the

was no public right-of—way,

District t0 hear

would be no

there

an abandonment proceeding because

I.C. §

40-203 provides a process t0 consider abandonment and vacation 0f a public highway 0r public
right-of—way. Until there

n0

is

statutory authority for a

a determination that a disputed public right-of—way

highway

district

board t0 consider

its

is

public, there

is

abandonment and vacation.

Additionally, the Palmer Family Trust’s above issue claiming a procedural irregularity that

prejudiced

its

rights fails for a

more fundamental

reason.

When

a judgment

is

granted 0n

alternative grounds

and one of them

judgment. Cuevas

Barraza, 155 Idaho 962, 964-65, 318 P.3d 952, 954-55 (2014). In rejecting

this

v.

argument below, the

District

is

not addressed 0n appeal, this Court must afﬁrm the

Court held the Palmer Family Trust and not shown

suffered any injury, and therefore, “Appellant has n0 standing t0 allege errors

its

opening appellate brief which the

trial

court ignored, thus giving

actually

on behalf 0f the

Warners.” R. pp. 186-187. The Palmer Family Trust shows n0 error below where
injury in

it

it

alleged an

them standing

t0

bring the alleged claim.

in fact

On

appeal to this Court, the Palmer Family Trust

by claiming the Board would have been precluded from refusing

public right-of—way, but provides no citations to the record below Where

the district court.

it

tries t0 raise

an injury

t0 validate the alleged

made

this

argument

t0

This Court has repeatedly held that an appellate court Will not decide issues

presented for the ﬁrst time on appeal. Hungate

(Docket 461 14 released 02/25/2020).
alternative standing holding

alleged procedural error

by

0f the

v.

Bonner County,

_

Idaho

_,

_

P.3d

Because the Palmer Family Trust did not address the

district court 0r raise prejudice t0 the district court

from the

the District, the district court’s decision judgment regarding this issue

should not be reversed.

The second appeal

issue raised

reverse the District because

presumed

in the

it

by

the Palmer Family Trust

presumed the same

abandonment 0f the

is

the district court’s refusal t0

regularity in the establishment 0f the road as

road. In addressing this issue, the district court held:

Appellant argues the District erred by relying upon the Kootenai County
Board of Commissioners’ July 13, 1910, minutes which indicated that the Kootenai

County Board of Commissioners abandoned the road. Appellant contends there is
n0 evidence that this abandonment was accomplished by the passage 0f a proper
ordinance as required by the law in effect at the time, R.C. § 882(4).

The Court presumes
public officers.” Roberts

v.

“regularity in the performance 0f ofﬁcial duties

by

Bd. 0fTrustees., Pocatello, Sch. Dist. N0. 25, 134 Idaho

890, 894, 11 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2000). “Absent evidence to the contrary,” public
ofﬁcers “are presumed t0 have properly carried out the duties oftheir ofﬁce.” Farm

Bureau Finance

C0., Inc.

v.

Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 750, 605 P.2d 509, 514 (1980).

This presumption can be rebutted by production 0f evidence showing that the public

ofﬁcer failed t0 carry out the duty
at

1 1

at issue.

Roberts, 134 Idaho at 894-95, 605 P.2d

12-13.

Appellants have presented no evidence showing the Kootenai County Board
0f Commissioners in 1910 failed t0 pass a proper ordinance. Therefore, the

it

presumption

0f

regularity

and

applies,

Kootenai

the

County

Board

of

Commissioners are presumed to have properly carried out the duties of their ofﬁce.
Further, in this case, the District applied the presumption 0f regularity t0 the
Commissioners’ action approving the Viewers report in 1908 and also to the 1910

abandonment. The District presumed that the Commissioners had held the proper
hearings and passed the proper ordinances in each instance. If the presumption 0f

regularity does not apply, the record reﬂects no proper ordinance approving

the right—of—way, Which, by Appellants own logic, would necessitate the
conclusion that n0 right—of—way ever existed because there is not a proper

ordinance reﬂected in the record. (Emphasis added.)

Rpp. 181-182.
The Palmer Family Trust
opening

brief.

criticizes the District Court’s

Opening Appeal Brief at

the district court’s above analysis.

presumption 0f regularity in the

Road N0.

2,

it

The

However,

it

BOCC procedures

in

its

provides no argument 0f law rebutting

district court did

not err in ﬁnding that there

is

a

1908 in approving and accepting Leonard

and the same presumption 0f regularity

abandoning Leonard Road N0.

As

12.

presumption 0f regularity in

in the

BOCC

procedures in 1910 in

2.

did below, the Palmer Family Trust urges this Court to adopt a dichotomy in the

presumption 0f regularity depending 0n whether

this

Court

is

analyzing the acceptance and

approval 0f the public right-of—way as opposed t0 the abandonment of the public right-of—way.

Regarding the acceptance and approval of the public road, the Palmer Family Trust desires
Court t0 presume there was an ordinance and

all

procedures related to the creation of the public

right-of—way were done in accordance with the statutes provided herein,
in the procedures

0f the

BOCC. On the

presume there was n0 ordinance and

all

this

i.e.,

t0

presume regularity

other hand, the Palmer Family Trust desires this Court to

procedures related t0 the abandonment 0f the public right-

10

of—way were not done in accordance with the
in the procedures

based upon

BOCC’S
B.

0f the

this the

BOCC.

This

statutes

district court

Palmer Family Trust’s desire

provided herein,

i.e.,

t0

presume

irregularity

did not err in refusing to reverse the District

t0

have two different standards applied

t0 the

actions.

The

district court did not err by holding that substantial and competent evidence
supported the District’s conclusion that the validation 0f Road N0. 231 was not in the

public interest.

Under
District

the ﬁrst ofﬁcial issue raised

Board did not

on appeal, the Palmer Family Trust argues

act in the public interest

public right—of—way; and 2) the District

When

was required

it

declined t0 validate

to illustrate

that:

Road N0. 231

and explain

its

Idaho Code section 40-203A(3) provides:
proceedings, the commissioners shall determine whether

highway or public right-of—way is in the public interest and
enter an order validating the highway 0r public right-of— way as public or

validation 0f the

declaring

it

shall

not t0 be public.

In addressing this issue

0n appeal, the

district court held:

"Section 40-203A(3) notably omits a speciﬁc requirement for written ﬁndings. This
statutory requirement

by

its

plain language governs the substantive standard the

Board must apply when deciding Whether t0 validate a road." Sopatyk v. Lemhi
Cty., 151 Idaho 809, 816, 264 P.3d 916, 923 (201 1). "This Court's role, therefore,
is simply to determine Whether it was clear error for the Board t0 determine that
was [not] in the public interest. This Court may therefore afﬁrm the
validat[i0n]
Board's order even though it does not cite speciﬁc facts to support its public-interest
ﬁnding." Id. (internal citations omitted) (alterations added for clariﬁcation).
..

There

is

.

also substantial evidence that validation

interest to support the District's conclusion.
right- of-way.

would not have been

in the public

There were n0 deeds granting a public

See Agency Record Generally. The 1910 minutes reﬂected that the

11

as a

public interest

conclusions.

Upon completion of the

1) the

AR

road had been abandoned.

69.

N0

evidence was presented to the District

demonstrating statutory creation of public right-of—way under

I.C. §

40-202(3) by

showing ﬁve years 0f public use accompanied by ﬁve years ofpublic maintenance.
See Agency Record Generally. Again, it is not for this Court to second guess the
District's decision as t0 whether the roadway would be in the public interest, but
only to determine Whether the conclusion reached by the District was supported by
substantial competent evidence. This Court ﬁnds the District met such requirement.

R pp
On
evidence

it

18 1 - 1 82.

appeal, the Palmer Family Trust takes issue With the district court’s failure t0

presented (consisting 0f historical

maps and testimony that members of the public were

interested in reaching the west side 0f Rose Lake).

the

Board concluded

that, “[t]he

weigh

The Palmer Family Trust

correctly notes that

evidence received by the [ESHD] Board 0f Commissioners

provides no basis for validation 0f

Road N0.

231, Leonard

Road N0.

2.”

Appellants Opening

Appeal Brief at pp. 13-14.

The

district court

did not err in holding such facts did not evidence the creation 0f a claim

for a public right-of—way.

This evidence was not accompanied by any evidence 0f public use

combined with public maintenance over the same ﬁve (5) year period as to

create a public easement

pursuant to I.C. § 40-202(3).

Disregarding the means by Which the public

may

gain an interest in a public right-of—way,

the Palmer Family Trust argues the district court erred in failing to exercise

that public

its

discretion and hold

convenience outweighs property rights protected by Idaho law. The road should be

validated, argues the

in reaching the

Palmer Family Trust, because “there were members 0f the public interested

west side 0f Rose Lake.” Opening Brief for Appellant

over convenient access to resources, however, d0 not permit the

12

at 7.

The

district court t0

public’s concerns

allow a highway

district t0 Violate private

Galvin

landowners’ protected rights t0 property ownership. This Court held in

Canyon Highway Dist. N0.

v.

40-203A may only be used
there

some kind 0f doubt.

is

4,

134 Idaho 576, 579, 6 P.3d 826, 829 (2000) that “Section

to validate

an existing highway or public right-of—way about Which

It

does not allow for the creation 0f new public rights.”

Inherent in property law
"Article

I,

is

the tension

between public

section 14 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fifth

rights

and private property

Amendment 0f the

interests.

U.S. Constitution

both prohibit the government from taking private property for public use without just
compensation." Sopalyk v. Lemhi County, 15 1 Idaho 809, 816, 264 P.3d 916, 923 (201
omitted).

1) (footnotes

A property owner must either voluntarily give the property t0 the public entity,

property t0 the public entity, 0r the public entity must gain a right through Idaho
0r exercise

its

power 0f eminent domain

property owner for the property.

To use

t0

condemn

Code

§

sell the

40-202(3)

the property and fairly compensate the

a road validation t0 obtain property rights

would constitute

an inverse condemnation.

The Palmer Family

Homestead Farms

Inc.

v.

Trust’s reasoning also runs contrary t0 this Court’s holding in

Bd. 0f Comm’rs, 141 Idaho 855, 119 P.3d 630 (2005). In Homestead

Farms, the Board of Commissioners attempted
Idaho county t0
Idaho

map

at 857,

make an

119 P.3d

at

ofﬁcial

632.

map 0f the

The Board

to

comply With

I.C. §

county’s highway system.

drafted, without record

with colored lines indicating the county’s public highways.

map showed three public roads running

40-202, Which requires each

of how

Homestead Farms, 141
this drafting

Id. at 857,

119 P.3d

was done, a
at

across private land. Id. at 857, 119 P.3d at 632.

then notiﬁed landowners in the county of the public roads t0

13

start invalidation

632.

The

The Board

proceedings for any

road that the landowner believed was not a public highway.

Id. at 857,

119 P.3d

at 632.

The two

landowners over Whose land the roads ran brought the dispute, claiming the roads were not public
in the ﬁrst place

at 632.

and should not have been included 0n the Board’s

The Court held that, because

the record held

no evidence

initial

map.

Id. at 857,

that the disputed roads

119 P.3d

were ever

properly created as public highways, the Board erred in assuming the roads t0 be public roads and
requiring the landowners to initiate proceedings to vacate the roads. Id. at 860, 119 P.3d at 635.

Despite recognizing the Board entered a written conclusion that the evidence received by
it

at the initial

Road N0.
was

2,

hearing and the re-Opened hearing provided n0 factual basis for it t0 validate Leonard

The Palmer Family Trust proceeds

substantial

and competent evidence, including a dearth of relevant evidence

support the District’s conclusion that

N0.

to argue that the district court erred in

it

was not

in the record, to

in the public’s interest t0 validate

Leonard Road

2.

The Palmer Family Trust urges
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

this court t0 take a

Law and

myopic View 0f the

23 1 Leonard Road N0.
,

was

if the

2, is

District’s entire

Order on Rehearing, focusing solely one conclusion

read out 0f context with the entire decision. Conclusion N0. 2

it

ﬁnding there

not in the public interest.”

states,

R p. 701.

“The validation 0f Road N0.

The Palmer Family Trust claims

error for the district court t0 consider the remainder 0f the District’s decision in determining

requirements 0f Idaho Code 40-203A(3) were met, and Whether

district court to

it

was

clear error for the

consider the evidence set forth above.

Conclusion N0. 3

states,

“The evidence received by the Board 0f Commissioners provides

n0 basis for validation 0f Road N0. 23 1, Leonard Road N0. 2.”

14

R p. 701.

The

district court

agreed

with

The

this conclusion.

validation order indicates that after consideration 0f the additional

evidence received as the re-opened public hearing, as well as the
to validate

because

not in the public’s

it is

interest in the right-of—way

to validate the

Under

The order

interest.

was abandoned by

the

initial

hearing, the

also notes the public’s claim t0 an

BOCC and there is n0 legal basis for the Board

abandoned Leonard Road N0. 2 as a public right-of—way.
the Palmer Family Trust’s

Board declines

View 0f the public

AR pp.

699-702.

interest, the district court erred

reading the District’s decision in context and considering the evidence before the District
issued

its

decision.

right-of—way

Even though

the District

made

by

when

it

clear in the decision that the claim to a public

was premised upon an approved and accepted viewer’s

report that

was

later

abandoned, and that there was n0 other evidence 0f establishment of a public right-of—way (such
as a right—of—way established pursuant t0

LC.

§ 40-203, a decree

0f possession granted pursuant t0

an eminent domain judgment, a deed granting right-of—way, or a plat dedicating right-of—way), the

Palmer Family Trust contends the

district court erred in

considering the entire decision and should

not have considered the entire written decision.

The Palmer Family Trust
to provide a detailed explanation

be able to determine

if the

is

dogmatic in

right-of—way.

It’s

argument that the

board appropriately exercised

from the evidence

it

it is

its

Board was required
district court t0

discretion with respect to the

very apparent in the District’s decision that the

received that

it

had a legal basis

also apparent in the district court’s decision that

reasons for declining to

District

of its public interest conclusion in order for the

evaluation of the public interest, even though

District did not believe

its

it

t0 claim a public

understood the District’s

ﬁnd validation was in the public’s interest was because there was n0 factual
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basis t0 support a

right-of—way.

ﬁnding

that the District

had a

legal interest t0 assert the existence 0f a public

Yet, the Palmer Family Trust alleges that the district court erred, “...when

approved 0f ESHD’S error that

it

hid the criteria upon which

public interest, because the original design 0f Leonard
the west side 0f Rose

it

it

found validation was not in the

Road No. 2 was

to grant public access to

Lake and other natural wetland resources.” Opening Brief 0n Appeal

at p.

22.

The Palmer Family Trust reasons
Whether the Board abused

Board must

discretion

its

spell out its reasoning

that,

because the

When drawing

on the public

its

public interest conclusions, the District

interest issue in painstaking detail.

concluded from the Palmer Family Trust’s extended argument that
decision adequate only if

because there

is

it

said, “It is

no evidence

interest for this

by

is

may have had was
interest

abandoned, and

when the

the evidence received in the validation record, the decision

LC.

would have attorney

required

is

decision

would

by

it is

can be

District’s

is t0

the

not in the public’s

would not be supported

likely

fees assessed against

§ 12-1 17 for the District taking a position not supported

The Palmer Family

would consider the

a public right-of—way, in fact the evidence

Board to validate a right-of—way

appeal, and perhaps the District

it

It

not in the public’s interest t0 validate this right-of—way

that there

contrary because any interest the public

authorized t0 determine

district court is

it

be overturned on

0n appeal pursuant t0

facts.”

Trust’s argument that such an explicit public interest statement

is

not supported by either statutory law 0r Idaho Supreme Court precedent. The relevant

statute provides:

16

Upon completion 0f

the proceedings, the

commissioners shall determine

Whether validation 0f the highway 0r public right of way is in the public
interest and shall enter an order validating the highway 0r public right of way
as public 0r declaring it not t0 be public.
I.C. §

40-203A(3). The

district court

did not err in holding that the plain language 0f the statute

notably omits a requirement of ﬁndings of fact regarding the public interest determination. The
statute only requires that

such a determination must be made.

Palmer Family Trust argues

Alternatively, the

is

impossible for a court t0 properly exercise

Board to the public

.

t0 determine

the Palmer Family Trust

its

that,

discretion t0 determine if

Whether the District Board abused

is correct.

not equivalent t0

explanations

in

its

discretion.

it

facts,

it

clear error for the

discretion.

it is

On this point,

impossible for a

Speciﬁc

facts,

however,

0f the agency’s decision-making process. Comparing

Homestead Farms With Sopalyk illustrates
The decision

its

Without enumerating speciﬁc facts,

reviewing court t0 determine whether the agency abused
are

Without enumerating speciﬁc

this distinction.

Homestead Farms turned 0n whether

the Board’s decision t0 classify the

disputed roads as public was supported by the facts in the record.

Homestead Farms Inc.

Comm’rs, 141 Idaho 855, 860, 119 P.3d 630, 635 (2005). Finding no

v.

Bd. 0f

facts in the record that

supported the Board’s determination, the Court held that the Board had acted erroneously.

Id. at

860, 119 P.3d at 635. In contrast, after holding that highway districts need not explain their

ﬁndings, the Sopatyk Court looked t0 the record t0 determine whether the ﬁndings 0f the Board

were an abuse 0f discretion. Sopalyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 817-18, 264 P.3d 916, 92425 (2011). The Court examined the

facts in the record, applied those facts t0 the statutory
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framework, and concluded that the Board did not abuse

Because there were

its

public interest ﬁndings

discretion. Id. at 8 1 8,

which supported the Board’s

facts in the record

determine whether the Board abused

its

its

discretion.

was n0 hinderance

at 925.

was

able to

ruling, the Court

The Board’s decision

to the

264 P.3d

in

Sopatyk not to explain

reviewing Court’s ability t0 examine whether

those ﬁndings were an abuse 0f discretion.

C.

The

district court did

not err in holding the District had cause as deﬁned by

applicable statutory provisions t0 initiate validation proceedings.

Under the second
Board did not have

issue

it

raises

0n appeal, the Palmer Family Trust argues

statutory authority 0r

good cause

Palmer Family Trust gives three arguments explaining
initiate the validation

First, the

proceeding as

it

did.

initiate validation

t0 initiate the validation proceeding.

why the

District

None of these arguments

Palmer Family Trust argues the

that the District

Board had n0 authority

are persuasive.

district court erred in

ﬁnding cause existed

proceedings under LC. § 40-203A(1)(a). Speciﬁcally, the

right-of—way due t0 omission 0r defect. The record reﬂects that the Kootenai

County Commissioners approved a viewer’s report laying out a public road in 1908;
AR 63. However, the record does not reﬂect that any easements of record granting
Kootenai County the public right-of—way were ever executed. See Agency Record

As

such, through omission or defect, doubt existed as to the legal

establishment 0f a public right-of—way, so the District properly initiated validation

proceedings as provided for in LC. § 40-203A.

Rp.

181.
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to

district court held:

Moreover, cause also existed t0 initiate validation proceedings under LC. §
40-203A(1)(a) because doubt existed as t0 the legal establishment of the claimed

generally.

The
t0

LC.

40-203A authorizes highway

§

own resolution

proceedings 0n their
establishment

.

.

.

The 1908

“if,

district

commissioners to

through omission 0r defect, doubt exists as t0 the legal

0f a highway 0r public right 0f way.” LC.
statute that

initiate validation

§ 40-203A(1)(a).

deﬁnes the proper procedure used

t0 establish a public right—of—way

provides in pertinent part:

In

all

cases

Where consent

highway

t0 use the right—of—way for a

voluntarily given, purchased, 0r condemned and paid

for, either

is

an instrument

and
acknowledged by the party making it, or a certiﬁed copy of the decree 0f the
court condemning the same, must be made and ﬁled and recorded in the ofﬁce
0f the recorder 0f the county, in which the land s0 conveyed or condemned
must be particularly described. (Emphasis added.)

in writing conveying the right—of—way and incidents thereto, signed

Revised Code Section 930.

By the plain

statutory language, an

easement granting the County a public right-of—way must be

conveyed by a written instrument which particularly describes the terms of the right-of—way.

Id.

No record ofthose required easements is found in the Kootenai County records. The Palmer
Family Trust argues

this is

because certain records are missing from Kootenai County. Regardless

0f why the records aren’t found, without these easements, there

of—way for Road No. 231 was properly established
LC.

§

40-203A

is

thus satisﬁed.

The

district court

The Palmer Family Trust claims
I.C. §

40-203A because

doubt as t0 Whether the right-

The omission-doubt requirement of

did not err in entering the above ﬁnding.

that the absence

the 1908 Revised

t0 create a public right—of—way.

in 1908.

is

Code did not

0f these deeds

not an omission under

require the deeds t0 be recorded in order

The Palmer Family Trust reasons
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is

that

Revised Code section 930

applies only t0 private roads discussed in Revised

discussed in the rest of the

is

section 929, not to the public roads

This reasoning misinterprets the statute.

title.

The term “highway”

Code

deﬁned term under this

a

title

of the Revised Code. Revised Code

section 874 deﬁnes highways as follows:

Highways are roads,

streets or alleys,

public, 0r if laid out 0r erected

by

and bridges laid out 0r erected by the

others, dedicated 0r

abandoned

t0 the

public. (Emphasis added.)

Revised Code Section 874.

Applying the proper deﬁnition to the term, When Revised Code Section 930 uses the verbiage “the
right

of

way

for the

highway,” the

statute

cannot be referring t0 the private roads discussed in

Revised Code Section 929. Revised Code section 930 can only be referring t0 rights—of—way for
public roads

— highways. Instruments conveying land t0
highway”

for “the right-of—way for a

t0

the

County are required by

statute for the

be authorized. The Palmer Family Trust’s argument 0n

this point is invalid.

Assuming arguendo

that the

Palmer Family Trust

is

correct regarding the application of

Section 930 as applying only to Section 929, the district court

determining the District had authority to
In the section 0f the Viewer’s Report

initiate a validation

it is

did not

commit

proceeding due to omission or defect.

I

know. As Rehﬁeldt

understood that he favors the road.”

AR p.

lives in

059.

Spokane,

On the

060.

The language 0n

that

page indicates,

“NOW, THEREFORE,

20

we

did not

next page 0f the

Viewer’s Report, the standard right—of—way grant from the affected property owners
p.

error in

which discussed the acquisition 0f right-of—way, the Viewer

reported “n0 nonconsenting parties so far as

get t0 see him, but

still

is

found.

AR

KNOW ALL MEN BY

THESE PRESENTS,
hereby release

all

That

the owners 0f the land described below, for value received, do

claims to damages sustained by

Mr. Rehﬁeldt’s name

road through our lands.
description.

we

The grant

is

only signed by

Earling over and across their lands.

indication in the

his property.

Ed

AR p.

is

me by reason 0f the

survey and opening 0f said

crossed off on that grant, along With his legal

Hussner, Marie Hussner, Fred Earline and Augusto

60.

These four signatures are notarized. There

is

n0

Viewer Report itself that Mr. Rehﬁeldt consented to a public road over and across

Thus, through omission 0r defect, the record shows doubt exists as t0 the legal

establishment 0f the r0ad.3

The Palmer Family Trust argues
commissioners, are highways.
report,

that roads laid out

Yet, Rev.

Code

and recorded by order of the board of

section 925 provided, “If the board approve the

and there are no non-consenting land owners, the road must, by order, be declared a public

highway...’

9

It

further provided, “If there are non-consenting land owners, the board

must

appropriate from the road fund, and cause the road overseer to tender to such non-consenting land

owners, the award of damages

made by the

board. If the awards are

all

declared a public highway and be opened as hereinbefore provided.
section 926 further provides if the

damage award

isn’t

3

were acquired through such a proceeding

It is

in the

R.C.

§ 925.

Revised Code

accepted that the board must procure the

right-of—way through a proceeding (similar t0 eminent domain). There

rights

accepted the road must be

is

n0 record that Rehﬁeldt’s

Viewer’s Report. Thus, due t0 an omission

just such doubt that validations are intended to address.

Absent evidence 0f any abandonment of this

recording by the BOCC would support a ﬁnding
by the highway district board, presuming regularity, that the public right-of—way was valid.
road, the approval and acceptance 0f the Viewer’s Report, and
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its

in the record,

it

cannot be discerned whether rights were ever acquired over Mr. Rehﬁeldt’s

property. Although the presumption 0f regularity supports a ﬁnding 0f regularity

still

an omission or defect in the record and a highway

district

may resolve

it

by a Board,

it is

through a validation

proceeding.

Second, the Palmer Family Trust resurrects

its

argument that because there was not a record

0f a proper ordinance abandoning Road N0. 231 in 1910, the

Road N0. 231 was abandoned

in 1910.

not err in presuming regularity in the

As

previously set forth in this brief, the district court did

BOCC’S abandonment proceeding.

The Palmer Family Trust produced n0 evidence to the District, nor has
on appeal, which supports

its

position that the district court erred

requirement

makes

its

is

its

duties, the

is

by presuming

cited

any evidence

regularity.

Palmer Family Trust’s argument about the proper ordinance

unpersuasive because

claim

it

1908-1910 Board 0f County Commissioners

Setting aside the presumption that the

properly fulﬁlled

determining

district court erred in

it is

illogical.

also the standard that defeats

The Palmer Family Trust argues
abandonment ordinances prevented the

its

The standard by Which the Palmer Family Trust
claim.

the district court erred in not holding that lack 0f an

district court

reversal 0fthe District’s validation decision.

from ﬁnding the road

The 1908 revised code

statute,

in 19 1 0 required

Revised Code section

882(2), provides in pertinent part:

The Board of County Commissioners, by proper ordinances must

.

.

.

(2) Cause t0 be surveyed, Viewed, laid out, recorded, opened and worked
such highways as are necessary for public convenience, as in this chapter
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provided.

.

[and] [a]bolish 0r

.

abandon such

as are unnecessary. (Emphasis

added.)

Revised Code Section 882(2).
to

0f the

statute, a

proper ordinance

is

required

both create and abandon a public highway.
Finally, the

§

By the plain language

Palmer Family Trust argues

40-2080) permits the

District

Board

that the district court erred

When

to resolve disputes over the legal status

it

held that I.C.

0f a public right-

of-Way. I.C. § 40-208(7) provides in relevant part:

When the legal status

or width 0f a

highway 0r public right—of—way

is

disputed and where a board 0f county or highway district commissioners
wishes t0 determine the legal status 0r width 0f a highway or public right—of—

way, the commissioners shall initiate validation 0r abandonment
proceedings, 0r both, as provided for in sections 40-203 and 40-203A, Idaho
Code, rather than initiating an action for quiet title. (Emphasis added.)
I.C. § 40-208(7). It is

unclear t0 the District’s counsel what substantive error the Palmer Family

Trust claims the district court made regarding this statute. District Board made. The Palmer Family
Trust

is

correct that the District did not cite t0 I.C. 40-208(7) as a basis for initiating a validation

proceeding. However, that fact does not necessarily create error by the district court in holding
that the District

had

statutory authority t0 initiate a validation proceeding.

This Court Will “uphold the decision of a

found

to support

it."

Syringa Networks,

P.3d 208, 222 (2016) (quoting Daleiden

LLC v.
v.

§

40-203A

as statutory grants that

court if any alternative legal basis can be

Idaho Dep’t 0fAdmin., 159 Idaho 813, 827, 367

Jeﬁ’erson Cnly. Joint Sch. Dist. N0. 251, 139 Idaho 466,

470-71, 80 P.3d 1067, 1071-72 (2003)). The

LC.

trial

district court cited

LC.

§

40-208(7) in tandem with

gave the District legal authority to conduct a validation
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proceeding under the facts and circumstances 0f this case Where the legal status of Leonard Road

No. 2 was disputed.

The Palmer Family Trust argues
is

true

under

Nor

this statute.

Idaho Code LC.

§

that the district could not initiate a quiet title action.

did the district initiate a quiet

40-208(7) directs

title

if there is a dispute

action.

regarding the legal status that the

Board shall initiate validation proceedings under Idaho Code section 40—203A. That
under which the Board initiated

its

validation proceeding.

That

is

the section

However, the Palmer Family Trust

seeks t0 exalt form over substance, and claim that since the resolution initiating the validation

proceeding that the
the district court

district court erred.

was allowed

to

ﬁnd

However, based upon the Syringe: Networks,
the District

had authority under the

LLC

holding,

alternative statute t0

conduct the validation proceeding.

The Palmer Family Trust
district court erred in

against raises in this section the tangential argument that the

ﬁnding n0 procedural error due

t0 the District’s decision not t0 continue the

validation hearing and consider the Warner’s petition t0 abandon the right-of—way.

argument was addressed

in the introduction section

of this

brief,

it

Since this

will not be reiterated here other

than to point out that LC. 40-208(7) leaves the decision t0 conduct a concurrent validation and

abandonment proceeding

t0 the

Board’s discretion.

D. The district court did not err in holding the Palmer Family Trust showed no injury
suffered by the denial 0f hearing the Warner’s motion t0 continue the validation

hearing t0 allow their petition for abandonment to be heard at the same time.

Under

Issue 3 0f the appeal,

The Palmer Family Trust

alleges

two

errors.

The Palmer Family

Trust claims: 1) that the District Board ignored the Warner family’s requests for an abandonment
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hearing; and 2) that if the

ﬁnd

in favor

The

abandonment hearing were

held, the District

of the Palmer Family Trust. Neither 0f these allegations

ﬁrst alleged error

is

Board would be bound

is

t0

accurate.

discussed at length in the Introduction to the arguments and will only

be summarized here. The Warmers were not denied a public hearing 0n their petition to abandon
the public right-of—way. Their request t0 continue the validation proceeding

were informed

it

would be handled

that separate matter are not part

However,

it is

The second alleged

that, if the

District

in the

it

a different time. The remainder of

error

— that the

District

is

right-of—way dispute

their petition is not supported

Warmers did not pursue the petition

had a public right-of—way because

abandonment hearing —

Road No. 231

at

Warners a public hearing on

easily conceivable that the

District declined t0 validate

Family Trust

manner

0f the agency record, and the Palmer Family Trust’s allegations

that the District refused t0 grant the

the record.

in the ordinary

was denied, and they

it

mooted

was heard

Board would have had no choice under LC.

§

after the

the petition.

Board was bound t0 ﬁnd

also incorrect.

by

in favor

0f the Palmer

The Palmer Family Trust reasons

as an

abandonment proceeding

that the

40-203 but to decline to abandon the road

because an abandonment would landlock the Palmer Family Trust’s property. The statutory
language the Palmer Family Trust

N0 highway or public

cites for this proposition reads in pertinent part:

right—of—way or parts thereof shall be abandoned and

vacated so as t0 leave any real property adjoining the highway or public right
0f way without access t0 an established highway or public right of way. The

burden of proof shall be on the impacted property owner
I.C.

§

to establish this fact.

40-203(2). Before a public right-of—way can be abandoned,

character that

it is

a public right-of—way.

Where

there

25

is

it

ﬁrst has to possess the

n0 public right-of—way

to

abandon, the

statutory language 0f

LC.

§

ﬂawed. The abandonment

40-203(2) does not apply.
statute

Thus, the Palmer Family Trust’s logic

would not have given them any substantive

is

right greater than

the characteristic 0f the disputed right-of—way.

E.

The district court did not err in holding quasi-estoppel did not preclude the
from refusing t0 Road N0. 231 as a public right-of—way.
Under the

fourth issue raised

Family Trust claims the

0n appeal,

district court erred

in a

District

rambling and convoluted argument, the Palmer

by ﬁnding a tax deed issued by Kootenai County

in

1931 to Paul Batzle did not estop the District from declining to validate Road No. 231 as a public
right-of—way.

The

district court held:

In issue #10, Appellant argues under the theory of quasi estoppel that

“because 0f the 1931 sale 0f Lot 8 alone t0 Paul Batzle, a sale 0f a property only
accessible by Leonard Road N0. 2, the ESHD should now be estopped from
invalidating that Leonard

Road N0.

2,

because there will be beneﬁts t0

ESHD and

injury t0 Palmers due t0 lack 0f access.”

Appellant’s Briefp. 29.

The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of beneﬁts; it
a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine
applies Where it would be unconscionable t0 allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he
precludes

accepted a beneﬁt.

Infanger

v.

City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45, 50, 44 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2002).

Appellant identiﬁes the beneﬁt allegedly gained by the District “in the form
ofﬁscal savings” ofnot having t0 construct and maintain the road. Appellant ’s Brief
p. 29.

any

However, Appellant

fails t0 identify

0r explain

how the District

position inconsistent With a position previously taken
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asserted

by the District.

Moreover, Appellant has not established that it would be unconscionable
allow the District t0 maintain its position. (Emphasis added.)

R p.

185

.

The Palmer Family Trust claims

was only

t0

accessible

that in 1931, the

by Leonard Road No.

2.

BOCC

This argument

is

Government Lot

sold

factually wrong.

By

8

When

it

193 1 Leonard
,

Road N0. 2 had been abandoned by the BOCC.
The Palmer Family Trust then conﬂates
District’s decision not t0 validate

it

was

the

err in

ﬁnding

that the

sale.

In fact,

it

its

by Leonard Road N0.

did not even exist until 1971.

Palmer Family Trust

any position inconsistent With

with the District and contends the

inconsistent with a position the District took in 1931

issued a tax deed 0n lands dependent 0n access

involved in the tax deed

BOCC

failed to identify or explain

The

how

District

was not

district court

did not

the District asserted

previous position.

For the ﬁrst time on appeal, the Palmer Family Trust argues
District t0

The

2.

when

“yank the access road away from Government Lot 8

in

it

was unconscionable

201 8” because the

for the

BOCC’S

tax

deed purchase was predicated upon Government Lot 8 having a public right-of—way access Via

Leonard Road No.

2.

The argument was not presented

to the district court

be considered on appeal. The argument presented was that
to retain

revenue

it

it

below and should not

was unconscionable

for the District

would (presumably) have otherwise expended on Leonard Road No. 2 had

been validated.4

4

Even

if the

disputed right-of—way would have been validated as a public right-of—way the District would not

have been required

to

expend funds on

its

maintenance. See I. C. § 40-1 I 7(9).
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it

However, even
argument
as the

Court does entertain the unconscionability argument 0n appeal,

factually incorrect

BOCC

certainly

sale

is

if this

was concerned,

and misperceives Idaho’s tax deed
it

believed

would not have believed

0f Government Lot

8.

that

record that such a representation

still

Palmer Family Trust

was made

Factually, as far

had abandoned Leonard Road No. 2

it

Leonard Road N0. 2

Further, the

sale statutes.

to the purchase

in 1910, so

failed t0 place

any evidence

0f Government Lot

in the

8.

When

unpaid to a county for a prescribed period 0f time, and the owner does not

redeem the property, the property goes up

for tax sale, regardless 0f whether

landlocked. See generally I.C. Title 63, Chapter 10.

upon a guarantee 0f a public right-of—way
Palmer Family Trust’s claim

access.

that the purchaser

a guarantee. Thus, the district court did not err

it

would be unconscionable

it

is

0r

is

There

is

simply n0 evidence t0 support the

of Government Lot 8 purchased based upon such

When it held that Appellant has not established that

to allow the District to maintain its position, either

under the ﬁscal

ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL

The

The

District

is

entitled to attorney fees

District is entitled t0 attorney fees

not

A tax deed sale is not statutorily predicated

gain theory argued below, 0r the access guarantee theory argued 0n appeal.

A.

it

existed at the time 0f the tax deed

This argument demonstrates a fundamental lack 0f understanding 0f county tax law.
real property taxes are

this

0n appeal

on appeal pursuant

12-1 17(2). These sections provide:
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to

LC.

§ 12-1 17(1) 0r I.C. §

Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency,
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including 0n appeal, shall
(1)

award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
it ﬁnds that the nonprevailing party acted without a

reasonable expenses, if

reasonable basis in fact 0r law.
(2) If a party to a

proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, and the

state

agency

0r political subdivision 0r the court hearing the proceeding, including 0n appeal,

ﬁnds

that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or

with respect t0 that portion of the case,

it

shall

award the

law

partially prevailing party

reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses with respect
t0 that portion

In

Rammell

v.

0f the case 0n Which

State,

it

prevailed.

154 Idaho 669, 302 P.3d

9,

18 (2012), in addressing LC. § 12-1 17, this

Court held:
This Court has held that LC.

§ 12-1

17 “authorizes the awarding 0f attorney

0n appeal.” Daw ex rel. Daw v. Sch. Dist. 9] Bd. 0fTrs., 136 Idaho 806, 808,
41 P.3d 234, 236 (2001). The Court employs a two-part test t0 determine if I.C. §
12-1 17 is invoked 0n appeal: (1) the party seeking fees must be the prevailing
party and (2) the nonprevailing party must have acted without a reasonable basis
in fact or law. City OfOSburn, 152 Idaho at 910, 277 P.3d at 357.
fees

Since the above holding was issued, LC. § 12-1 17(2) was enacted to allow an award of
attorney fees regarding only a portion of a case, including

On appeal,

on appeal.

the Palmer Family Trust has raised several issues.

basis in law 0r fact.

As

such, the District requests an

None 0f the

award 0f fees pursuant

issues have a

t0 I.C. § 12-1 17.

CONCLUSION
The

district court’s decision

should be awarded

its

should be afﬁrmed 0n appeal. Additionally, the District

attorney fees, 0r a portion 0f its attorney fees,
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on appeal.

Dated

this 16th

day of April, 2020.
James, Vernon

/s/ Susan P.

Susan

P.

& Weeks, P.A.

Weeks

Weeks
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District
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PUBLIC

WAYS

CHAPTER

Tit.

2.

HIGHWAYS.
Articie
1.
2.

Article

Enumeration of highways.
Rules and restrictions on use of

6.

highways.

7.

3.

Powers of commissioners
highway ofﬁcers.

4.

Highway
Highway

5.

out, altering and discof.‘
tinuing highways.
Erection
and
maintenance
bridges.
Obstructions and injuries to h ;.;=_.ways.

'

and
8.

taxes.

labor and commutation.

Laying

9.

Leasing highways.

ARTICLE I.
ENUM'ERATION 0F HIGH“'AYIS.
Section
8'14.

875.

Section

Highways deﬁned.
Hﬁcorded and worked highways.

Abandonment

876‘
877.

0f highways.
‘

Record of highway proceedin

Highways Deﬁned.
~

Sec. 874
Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and bridges, laiﬁ
out or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedii
cated or abandoned to the public.
llistm’lcal:

Rev.

St.

1881. Sec.

850.

California Legislation]: Same: Pol.
Code, 1372, Sec. 2618; similar: Deer~
ing's Code. ib.: Kerr's Code. lb.
Unauthorized Dedication: A private

land owner has no power to dailies,”
to the public any portion of the man
road’s right of way. Palmer v. Noni?!
ern Pac. Ry. Co. (1905) 11 Ida.
33 Pac. 947.

5m

Recorded and Worked Highways.

Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order 6f
Sec. 875.
the board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a perioﬂ
of ﬁve years, provided the latter shall have been worked and kept
up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of
the board of commissioners. are highways. Whenever any corporation owning a toll bridge, or a turnpike, plank, or common wagon
road is dissolved, or discontinues the road or bridge, or has expired
by limitation, the bridge or road becomes a highway.
Historical: Rev. SI. 1387. Sec. 851;

amended Laws 1893. 12. Sec. 1; reenacted Laws 1899. 153. Sec. 2.
Highways by Prescription: A highway by prescription exists by virtue of
user and not on the theory of a. grant
Thus it may be acor dedication.
quirrﬂ over open and nninclosed land
although the owner has no desire to
use the- land over Which the same
runs.
Gross v. McNutt (1895) 4 Ida.
300; 38 Pat. 936.
SamP-Necessity of “’urk: Under
this section, prior to the amendment
of 1893. roads used as such for
a.
perind nf ﬁve years were highways;
but subsequent to the amendment,
ﬁve years’ use and work by the proper

Abandonment

authoritites is required to constitute ﬂ,
public highway by prescription. Town
Ida.
at Juliaetta v. Smith (1906) 12
It is not necessary
288: 85 Pac. 923.

that

a.

highway be worked throughout

entire length at public expense tn
became- a highway by prescription; it:
need not be worked at places where
there is no necpssity for wurkins it.
its

v. McNult [1894) 4 Ida. 288:
38 Pan. 935‘ A mad cannot be deemed
a public highway by user where it was
constructed and kept 1n repair by a
private land owner who maintained a
Palmer v.
same.
gate across
the
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1905) 11 Ida.583; 83 Parr. 94?.

Gross

Highways.
road not worked or used for the period of ﬁve years
ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever.
Sec. 876.

of

A

PUBLIC WAYS
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is liable to the owner or to the occupant for the damage which
thereby sustained.

ﬂ
,

'

.

Rev.

1887. Sec. 862.
California Legislation: Same: Pol.
Code 1872. Sec. 2633; similar: DeerIllstm'ical:

St.

ing's

Code. i134 similar as
Kerr's 00'“: 1b‘

l

amend;

t

‘

x
‘

Corporations

May Lay

Tracks and Water Mains.
J

Every gas, water, or railroad corporation has power ﬂ
lay conductors and tracks through the public ways and Squares
any city, Village, or town when it is established, with the consent h
the municipal authorities thereof, and under such reasonable regulgn
tions, and for such compensation, as the authorities and the laﬁ'
Sec.

881.

’

f

prescribe.
llismrical: Rev. St. 1887. Sec. 363.
California. Legislation: Same except

“and rm- guch compensation,"

line

omitted:
reDea'ed:

Code 1872. Sec. 36%;;
Deering's COﬂe: “3T

Pol.

5.
f:

ARTICLE

3.

I

POWERS 0F CODIMISSIONERS AND IHGH‘WAY OFFICERS.
Section
882.
Duties of commissioners.
882a. Same: Additional Duties.
Creation and alteration oi road
883.
districts.
88-1.

885.

886.

Election of road overseers.
Duties of road overseers.
Same:
Collection of road poll
tax.

887.

,0;

Section
883.

Contracts for repair of hiﬁrwaYSDuties 0f contractors.
Failure to perform contract.
‘

389-

890.
891.
892.

Allowance of contractor's claim
Collection of poll tax in

diatrmm‘
893.

Every

city

a.

road

conm

district.

General road fund.

Duties of Commissioners.
Sec. 882.
The board of county commissioners, by proper Drainances, must:
Divide the county into a suitable and convenient number pf
1.

road districts;
Cause to be surveyed, viewed, laid out, recorded, opened and
2.
worked, such highways as are necessary for public convenience, as
in this chapter provided:
Cause to be recorded as highways such roads as have become
3.
such by use or abandonment to the public;
Abolish or abandon such as are unnecessary;
4.
Contract, agree for, purchase or otherwise acquire, the right5.
of—way over private property for the use of public highways, and
for that purpose institute, or require the county attorney to instltute,
proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure, and to pay therefor
from the district road fund 0f the particular district;
Let out by contract the improvement of highways, and com,
6.
struction and repair of bridges or other adjuncts to highways. When
the amount of work to be done by contract exceeds one hun
Pro-uided, That at least twenty-ﬁve per cent of the. fupd
dollars:
collected in any road district must be expended within the dlstrlct
in which such fund was collected;
7.
Levy a property road tax to be paid into the county road fund;
.

‘

E“

Ch.

2.

Same:

Art.

HIGHWAYS—LAYING

6.

481

OUT, ETC.

Special Reports.-

The commissioners may require
when deemed proper.

Sec. 913.

special

reports

from

road overseers

Rev. St. 1887, Sec. 906.
California Legislation: Similar: Pol.
Code 1872. Sec. 2686; repealed 1880.
Historical:

I

Money on Hand.
The road overseers must accompany their reports with
Sec. 914.
'in their hands at the date of the report.
In
all moneys remaining
addition to the reports required of road overseers in Section 912, each
road overseer shall, on the ﬁrst Monday of each month, report to the
auditor of his county all moneys that may have come into his hands
as such road overseer during the preceding month, stating therein,
Upon
particularly, the source from Which the same was derived.
receiving such report the auditor shall certify to the treasurer the
amount due from such road overseer and to What fund or funds the
same may belong. Within ﬁve days the road overseer making such
report shall pay over t0 the county treasurer the whole amount speciﬁed in his report for the preceding month. The treasurer shall then
make and ﬁle With the auditor a receipt for the amount paid, and the
auditor shall give to the road overseer a release for the amount and
charge the treasurer with the same.
Settlements for

Laws 1899.
Laws 1890—91,

Historical:

re-enacting

127, Sec. 6;
190, Sec. 5.

I

“Section 912” inserted for "Article ﬁve
of this chapter."

Penalty for Failure to Report.

A

failure to make a report as required, or to pay over
Sec. 915.
according to law, or on the order of the commissioners, any moneys
in his hands, subjects to the overseer to a penalty of twenty—ﬁve dollars
to be recovered in an action 0n his bond, together with any balance
due from him; suit therefor may be instituted by the prosecuting attorney under order of the board of commissioners.
Historical: Laws 1899, 127, Sec. 7;
re-enacting Laws 1890-91, 190, Sec. 6.

“Prosecuting
1

attorney"

for

“district

attorney."

ARTICLE 6.
LAYING OUT, ALTERING AND DISCONTINUING HIGHWAYS.
Section
916.

Petition for road.

917.

Contents of petition.

918.

Bonds for costs.
Appointment of viewers.

'

v

919.
‘

Duties of viewers.
Report of viewers.
Restrictions on line of road.
compensation of viewers_
Hearing on report.
Approval of report.
Condemnation of right of way.
Awards paid from road fund.

920.
921.
922.

923,
924.

92 5 .
928.
927.

Petition for
Sec. 916.

Nﬂ-

Section
928 Width
929.
930.
931.
932.
933.

of highways.
Establishment of private roads.

Record of

title

Railroads to

Removal

papers.

make

crossings.

of fences.

Turning roads

across

private

lands934.

Public roads established without
Viewers‘

935.

Same:

Bond

for

expense

of

survey_

Road.

Any

ten inhabitants of

a.

road district taxable therein

I
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Tit.

fpr road purposes, may petition in writing the board' of comm
Sloners to alter or discontinue any road or to lay out a new
therein.
Historical: Rev. St. 1887. Sec. 920.
See 13 Ter. Ses. (1885) 162, Sec. 2.
California Legislation: Same except
"the commissioner of highways or the
board of supervisors” for “the board
0f commissioners":
Pol. Code 1872,

Deering’s
2698; see
Code,
2681; Kerr‘s Code, ib.
Cited: Canyon
County v. To
(1904) 9 Ida. 561; 75 Pac. 609; La.

Sec.

88 Pac. 433.

-

Contents of Petition.
Sec. 917.
The petition must set forth and describe particular]?
the road to be abandoned, discontinued, altered, or constructed, anﬁ
the general route thereof, over what lands, and who the ownei-a
thereof are, whether the owners consent thereto, and if not, tlié
probable cost of the right of way, the necessity for, and the advan'itages of, the proposed change.

Historical:

Rev.

St.

1887. Sec. 921.

Pol.
California. Legislation: Same:
Code 1872. Sec. 2699: see Deering's
Code, Sec. 2682; Kerr’s Code, ib.
petiPctition—Mode of Attack:
tion for laying out a public road must

A

substantially contain the substantive
facts required to be stated by the provisions of this section. in order t0 give
the board jurisdiction of the subject
matter where the non-consenting land
owner fails: to appear and contest the

Bond

laying out 0f the highway, but if the
non-consenting land owner appears
and raises no objection to the forﬂé
of the petition, and proceeds as though
it were suﬁcient, and
introduces ha
testimony and prays for damages, h'e
cannot collaterally attack the order o!
the board on the ground 0f defecﬂ
in the petition, in

condemnation prg-

ceedings by the county.
Canyon 0b.
v. Toole (1904) 9 Ida. 561; 75 Fab.
609.

for Costs.

918.
The petitioners must accompany the petition with a
good and sufﬁcient bond, to be approved by the commissioners, in
double the amount of the probable cost of the viewing and laying out
or altering of any road, conditioned that the bondsmen will pay all
the costs of viewing and surveying in case the prayer is not granted,
and the road ﬁnally not opened.
Sec.

Historical: Rev. St. 1887, Sec. 922.
California. Legislation: Same except
“commissioners,”
“supervisors”
for

Appointment

line 2:

Pol.

Deering’s
Code, ib.

Code 1872,

Code.

Sec.

Sec. 2700; see,
2683; Kerr’s

of Viewers.

UpOn ﬁling such petition and bond, the board 0f com-j
missioners must appoint three Vlewers, one of whom must be a sur-f
veyor, to view and survey any proposed alteratlon of an 01d or opeping of a new road, ’co be made 1n accordance Wlth the descrlptlon In‘
the petition, and submit t0 the board an estlmate of the cost of‘thej
change, alteration, 0r openmg, includmg the purchase of the rlght,
0f way and their Vlews of the necessaty thereof.
Sec.

919.

‘

Historical: Rev. St. 1887, Sec. 923.
See 13 Ter. Ses. (1885) 162. Sec. 4.
California. Legislation: Same except
“commissioners":
“supervisors"
for
P01. (‘ode 1872, Sec. 2701; similar:
Kerr’s
2684;
De-ering’s
Code, Sec.
Code, ib.
The
County Surveyor as Viewer:

commissioners need not appoint the county surveyor one of the
viewers, but in case they do so, the‘
county surveyor does not act in his
oﬂicial capacity and must take the
oath prescribed by the following secLatah Co. v. Hasfurther (1907)
tion.
12 Ida. 797; 88 Pac. 433.
county

‘

H
Ch.2. Art.
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Duties of Viewers.

The road viewers must be disinterested citizens of the
Sec. 920.
county, but not petitioners; they must be sworn to discharge their
duties faithfully; must view and lay out the proposed alteration or
new road over the most practicable route; notify the owners of the
land over which it passes of the proposed route; ascertain Whether
the owners consent thereto, and the amount, if any, they claim or
demand for the right of way over the same; estimate the actual
damage to any land over Which it passes, and the cost of any bridges
or grading necessary; the necessity for and public convenience t0 be
subserved by the road, and whether the opening thereof, or change
therein prOposed should be had.
Rev. St. 1887. Sec. 924.
Legislation: Same: poL
Code 1872. Sec. 2702; similar: Deer—
ing’s Code, Sec. 2685; Kerr's Code. ib.
Failure to Take 0am: The failure
of a viewer to take the oath prescribed by this section renders the
Historical:

caufoma

I

1

-'

s

l

1

new road

is

When the view and survey of the proposed alteration or
completed, the viewers must report to the board of com—

missioners:
1.

|

EggécHafgfaurther (190‘) 12 Ida' 797'

Report of Viewers.
Sec. 921.

1

whole proceeding irregular and voidable on an appeal t0 the district court
“9’”. an order 9f the board 0f com”
mlssloners Openmg the, roadLatah

The

_

course, termini, length,

and

cost of construction of the pro-

posed road;

The estimate of damage to the owner of any land over which
proposed to run the road;
3.
The names of land owners who consent to give the right of
way and their written consent thereto;
4.
The names 0f land owners who do not consent, and the
amount of damage claimed by each;
5.
Such other facts bearing upon the subject, 0f importance t0
be known by the board of commissioners.
2.

it is

Hlstork-al: Rev. St.

See 13 Ter. Ses.

and

1887, Sec. 925.
162. Secs. 5

(1885)

16.

California Legislation:

Restrictions

Same

except

“supervisors"
P01.

”commissioners":
for
Sec. 2703; similar:
Kerr’s
Sec.
2686;

Code 1872.

Deering’s Code,
COde- lb~

on Line of Road.

No report of viewers must be approved by the board of
commissioners which, without the consent of the owner and occupant, runs the road:
1.
Through an orchard of four years’ growth;
2.
Through a garden or yard four years cultivated;
3.
Through buildings or ﬁxtures, or erections for the purposes
of residence, trade, or manufacture;
4.
Through inclosures necessary for the use or enjoyment 0f
buildings, ﬁxtures or erections;
Unless the board of commissioners are satisﬁed, from personal
examination and observation, or from the sworn statement of at
least twelve respectable residents of the road district, that the opening of such road through such premises is an absolute necessity,a
Sec. 922.

PUBLIC WAYS
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great public beneﬁt, or a great convenience b0 a moiety of the in-i
habitants of the district.
Historical: Rev. St. 1887, Sec. 926.
[California Legislation: Same except
“commissioners"
“supervisors”
for
Though inthroughout, and “or 5.

closed or
after SUbd-

improved lands" inserte}
43
POL COde 1872. SC

27043 repealed 1380'5.

Compensation of Viewers.
Sec. 923.

-4.

The viewers must be paid three

dollars each per day, for

m

and the surveyor, for services
running out and mapping the road and making the plat and ﬁeld
notes, which must be ﬁled when required before he receives his com-s—
pensation, ﬁve dollars per day.
their services, out of the road fund,

Laws 1899. 127, Sec.
Laws 1890-91, 190, Sec.

Historical:

re-enacting

8;
7.
7
'

Hearing on Report.

The board of commissioners, on the coming in of the?
Sec. 924.
report; must ﬁx a day for hearing the same; must notify the owners
of land, not consenting to give the right 0f way, of the hearing, by
having written notice served on them personally, 0r on the occupant,
0r agent of the owner, or, if neither, by posting notice at the most
conspicuous place on the land, or left at the owners’, agent’s, or occupant’s residence, ten days prior to the day ﬁxed for the hearing; and
must, on the day ﬁxed, or to which it may be postponed or adjourned,
hear evidence and proof from all parties interested for and against
the proposed alteration 0r new road; ascertain, and by order declare,
the amount of damage awarded to each non-consenting land owner,
and declare the report 0f the viewers to be approved or rejected. If
the report is rejected the road must not be altered or opened.
Historical: Rev. St. 1887, Sec. 928.
California Legislation: Same except
“supervisors"
“commissioners":
for

Pol.

Code 1872,

Deering's
COde- lb-

COde»

Sec. 2706: similar:
Ken’s
sec25333

Approval of Report.
If the board approve the report, and there are no nonSec. 925.
consenting land owners, the road must, by order, be declared a public
highway, and the road overseer ordered to open the same to the public.
If there are non-consenting land owners, the board must appropriate
from the road fund, and cause the road overseer to tender to such
non-consenting land owners, the award 0f damages made by the
board. If the awards are all accepted the road must be declared a
public highway and be opened as hereinbefore provided.

Laws 1899, 127.
Laws 1890-91, 190,

Historical:

re-enacting

Condemnation

of

Right

of

Sec. 9:
Sec. 8.

Way.

any award of damages is rejected by the land owners,
the board must, by order, direct proceedings to procure the right of
way to be instituted by the prosecuting attorney of the county, under
and as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, against all non-ac—
cepting land owners, and when thereunder the right of way is procured, the road must be declared a public highway and opened as hereSec. 926.

If

inbefore provided.

‘

W
Ch.

2.

Art.

HIGHWAYs—LAYING

6.

proceedings

Historical: Rev. St. 1887. Sec. 930.
California Legislation: Similar: Pol.

S

~2‘
égc“

c.

Tog; see Deerm g

are

brought under this

section cannot attack the decision of
the board granting the petition on_ ghe
groutlﬁd of (tihe faiéure of the petltlon
0r
t0 5e forth the mots ree ma
quired by Rev. St. Sec. 921 (Sec. 917).
Canyon Co. v. Toole (1904) 9 Ida.
561; 75 Pac. 609.

vs

26980; Ke‘rr.s

Code, ib'
Condemnation
Cross Reference:
proceedings: Secs. 5210-5229.
A non—consenting land
Defenses:
owner against whom condemnation

$33:
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Awards Paid From Road Fund.
A11 awards by agreement, or ascertainment by the board
Sec. 927.
or by the proper court, must be paid out of the road fund on the order
of the board of commissioners.

Laws 1899, 127. Sec. 10;
Laws 1890—91, 190, Sec. 9.

Historical:

re-enacting

Width

of

Highways.

All highways, except alleys and bridges, must be at least
ﬁfty feet Wide except those now existing of a less width.
Sec. 928.

“except alleys and bridges” omitted:
Pol. Code, Sec. 2710; repealed 1883.

Historical: Rev. St. 1887, Sec. 932.
See 13 Ter‘ Ses. (1885) 162, Sec. 10.
California Legislation: Same except

Establishment of Private Roads.
Sec.

929.

Private or by—roads

may

be opened for the convenience

of one or more residents of any road district in the same manner as
public roads are opened, Whenever the board 0f commissioners may for
like cause order the same to be viewed and opened, the person for
Whose beneﬁt the same is required paying the damages awarded to
land owners, and keeping the same in repair.

Opening Private Roads: By-roads
be opened for the convenience of
one or more residents in any road
district in the same manner as public
roads. the person oI' persons for whose
beneﬁt the road is opened paying the
damages awarded to land owners and
keeping the same in repair: one sig—

Historical: Rev. St. 1887, Sec. 933.
See 13 Ter. Ses. (1885) 162, Sec. 14.

may

California. Legislation: Same except
“supervisors"
“commissioners”:
for
Pol. Code 1872_ Sec. 2711; see Deering‘s Code. Sec. 2692; Kerr’s Code, ib.

This section is
Constitutionality:
not subject to the constitutional objection of attempting to
take private
property for private use. as it authorizes a private road, when opened,
to be used for any purpose to which
it is adapted
by the general public
and by any individual thereof. Latah
County v. Peterson (1892) 3 Ida. 398;
29 Pac. 1089.

nature

is

sufﬁcient

to

authorize

the

commissioners to take the
necessary steps to open a private or

(xnunty

by—roads, and it is not necessary t0
have ten signers to the petition as in
the case 0f a public road provided for
by Rev. St. Sec. 920 (Sec. 916). Latah
Co. v. Hasfurther (1907) 12 Ida. 797;
88 Pac. 433.

I

g7

I

,

w
[I

Record of Title Papers.

In all cases Where consent to use the right of way for
voluntarily given, purchased, or condemned and paid
for, either an instrument in writing conveying the right of way and
incidents thereto, signed and acknowledged by the party making it,
or a certiﬁed copy of the decree of the court condemning the same,
must be made and ﬁled and recorded in the ofﬁce of the recorder of
the county, in Which the land so conveyed or condemned must be
particularly described.
Sec. 930.

a highway

is

Historical: Rev. St. 1887, Sec.
California Legislation: Same:

934.
Pol.

Code 1872.
l

Sec. 2712: Deering’s Code.
Sec. 2693; Kerr’s Code, ib.

